The Ummah’s “Hollywood”: On American Muslim Exceptionalism
What do American Muslims and Hollywood have in common?
Outsized visibility, bespoke fashions, large followings, and peculiar social habits. These characteristics, among others, define Hollywood. A rather small group of individuals compensated lavishly for public performances, Hollywood celebrities are at once the subject of immense vicarious public interest, profoundly influential, and yet altogether distinct in their lives relative to broader society. As a class, Hollywood represents our cultural elite. Though they are diverse in many ways, they share the distinctive qualities of being objects of public attention and possessing enormous wealth.
Many years ago I found myself in a discussion with friends concerning the phenomenon of “American Islam.” It was clear to those in the conversation that American Muslims were, well, different. By this, we did not mean that they embraced different cultural realities, something that is equally true for Muslims in countries throughout the world. After all, Muslims in China do not dress like Muslims in Bangladesh, and neither wear the garb of West Africans. Distinct in their culture, Muslims globally nevertheless possess a cultural expression of Islam that is acceptable within the boundaries of the Sharia and therefore fully “Islamic,” as it were. Muslims in America have this as well, of course, which is simply to say that you can be a faithful Muslim in America – though it may in fact be more difficult in certain respects, it is nevertheless possible.
What we meant by difference was therefore not so much the cultural-aesthetic manifestation of Islam by Muslims and more of how American Islam seemed tethered to American social and political realities at an unhealthy level. This “tethered” relationship was such that the entire understanding of Islam by many Muslims in America found itself subordinate to and conditioned by American socio-political realities. Moreover, they were not only embracing those differences (such that aberrant, and at times, unjustified legal and theological views gained communal acceptance), but actively evangelizing those differences to the rest of the world. Like American culture itself, the peculiarities of American Islam possessed a certain global “power” which were difficult for others to escape.
In the course of the conversation, one of the fellows remarked that, in light of the above analysis, American Muslims sounded a lot like the ummah’s Hollywood. He was right. And, like Hollywood, they possessed not only the status of a social elite, but, derivative of that status, also operated with a particular sense of exceptionalism.
It was with this in mind that I recently came across Butheina Hamdah’s insightful Master’s Thesis entitled, “American Muslims, Exceptionalism, and Civil Religion: An Elaboration.” In it, Hamdah tracks social and religious developments both in the American religious sphere more broadly and the American Muslim community within it. Early in the work, Hamdah elaborates on the various ways American Muslims changed after 9/11, including their assimilation and embrace of an “authentically American Identity” which marked a shift from their prior “Islamic Exceptionalism” which placed loyalty to Muslim faith before their uniquely American Identity. Throughout the paper, Hamdah draws on various thinkers and studies that loosely share an assessment of Muslims in America embracing a domestic “difference” from the rest of the umma as well as possessing a desire to spread their specific beliefs and practices as models for the rest of the world. In this, American Islam is not only regarded as different, but better on account of its ability to “integrate and reconcile American political principles.”
In concluding the study, Hamdah synthesizes three thematic components which emerged during interviews she conducted as part of her study:
“The indigenization of American Islam (of which the Black American experience is central) works to undo the idea of Islam being foreign to the United States and prove that American Muslims have and continue to be integral to the United States’ civil religious narrative.”
“Weak exceptionalism,” a term drawn from Rachel Gordan, which relates to how “freedom of religion and expression in the United States enable them [i.e., American Muslims] to authentically live as Muslims and potentially influence Muslims overseas.”
Exceptionalism from the “particular to universal.” This theme focuses on questions of social and religious negotiation on account of identity. In relation to the American Muslim community, the theme is perhaps best understood thusly: Islam asserts particular truth claims. Of the most important is that Islam is the singular path of truth, and, accordingly, requires believers to bind themselves to the bonds of faith as understood in the Quran and Prophet’s Sunna. This theo-communal solidarity is represented in the form of ummah, of which no citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, or other commitment takes priority. The question here was how American Muslims conceive of that solidarity – do they feel any duties towards the ummah? Should the ummah matter when considering the problems Muslims in America face? Hamdah detected in her studies a tension between opposition to hyperlocalization and American imperialism, on the one hand, and ummatic commitments on the other. She argues that American Muslims have ultimately adopted an exceptionalism that is not informed by “Islam’s unique relationship to the politics and resistance to secularization,” but instead by the “American” identifier which grants the community sociopolitical import.
Although I am generally loath to appeal to it too much conceptually (for various reasons), it is crucial here to recognize that one of the rather serious problems with the exceptionalism of American Islam is the privilege it possesses. America is the global hegemon of our age. It defines and spreads its culture, its values, establishes and oversees international institutions, systematically rewards allies and depresses enemies, and sets the tone for myriad discourses around the world. The draw and allure of American culture is so profound that one can hardly miss it when observing societies around the world: gone is their traditional clothing, their native languages are in decline, and their media frequently produce facsimiles of western programming. Global interest in American affairs is on prominent display during presidential election cycles: the entire world debates and discusses the nominees and candidates, follows closely primaries and headline stories about the candidates, and cannot help but find affinity with a particular political class or community. This power – the power to influence others and spread one’s story to others – is reflected well in a quote attributed to Joseph Stalin (though it is unclear whether he ever uttered the words) where he said: “If I could control the medium of the American motion picture, I would need nothing else to convert the entire world to communism.”
“If I could control the medium of the American motion picture, I would need nothing else to convert the entire world to communism.” - Joseph Stalin (allegedly)
Thomas Borstelmann in his work Just Like Us recounts in exacting detail the various ways in which American hegemony has operated – linguistically by the spread and often mandatory imposition of English; militarily through conquest; economically through commerce, trade, and consumer culture; culturally through media; and more. Borstelmann regards this hegemony a subversive force, explaining it thusly:
If there was, in fact, a subversive force loose in the world of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, it might best be seen as coming not from the usual outside suspects but from America’s own democratic ideals, combined with America’s own absorptive popular culture and seemingly infinite consumer pleasures. That culture and its products encouraged the spread of the viruses of individualism, of headlong material consumption, of perpetual innovation, and of the relentless quest for wealth, which tended to disrupt other more traditional cultures. “What is the process of civilizing,” the prominent U.S. clergyman Josiah Strong had asked in 1885, “but the creating of more and higher wants?” Americans have been at the front edge of that “process of civilizing” ever since.
Like America sociopolitically, so too with American Muslims communally. American Muslims today frequently find themselves at the center of global Muslim discourse. Their public squabbles and disputes become matters of immense interest to scores of Muslims around the world. Their religious leaders are admired and followed in corners far and wide. One can find commoners on the streets of Rawalpindi, Dhaka, and Kuala Lampur who have heard lectures by popular preachers like Nouman Ali Khan but cannot name a single scholar in their own lands – often not even an imam at a neighborhood mosque. Anecdotally, I have been told by students of knowledge in other lands that the students closely track the ongoings of American Muslims on social media, with one student recounting to me in astonishing (and terrifying!) detail a minor “social media scandal” from years back and how nested comments on Twitter and Facebook were being screenshotted and shared as play-by-play among the tullab.
Given the spread of western technology, Muslims around the world now search and discover religious discourse in western media, on sites put together by American Muslims, and on social media sites dominated by westerners. So thorough is this spread that even religious discourse in other languages is encroached upon by liberally inclined Muslims capable of speaking those languages residing in the West, as evidenced by Javed Ghamidi (now in Texas), or perhaps even Adnan Ibrahim who resides in Austria. Digital colonialism, to be sure, is real.
This of course is not meant to suggest that everything from America should be treated with suspicion or reflexively rejected. I of course am writing as someone residing in America. The point is that there is a measure of attention disproportion that reflects American privilege and power, and that said power is being levied quite often to modify the beliefs and practices of Muslims around the world, to – wittingly or unwittingly – enamor those Muslims in far away lands with the peculiarities of American Muslim culture and its icons, to preoccupy them with the disputes and controversies pervading American Muslim communities, and to orient them towards the very specific Islam being peddled by disparate American Muslims actors and groups irrespective of the reliability of said positions, views, and scholarship, and often in lieu of even considering the scholars in their own lands.
Can we deflate the intensity of global interest in all things American? Is there a way to flatten our digital discourse, to promote others with the goal of better representation, particularly in elevating pious ulama who are being overlooked, while maintaining a primary commitment to the faithful upholding of Islamic norms and values? I believe so, but we cannot do so until we recognize the existing dynamics for what they are, to foment and promote a greater umma focus, and agree above all else to an a priori commitment to Allah and His Messenger ﷺ.
Imam Omar Suleiman recently appeared on Lex Fridman’s podcast. I have listened to about half (the entire interview is over three hours long!) and have thoroughly enjoyed what I have gotten through. Give it a listen.
L.M. Sacasas writes on chatbots and the rise of AI interfaces: “We anthropomorphize because we do not want to be alone. Now we have powerful technologies, which appear to be finely calibrated to exploit this core human desire.”
Apparently the popular children’s book publisher Puffin has decided to substantially edit Roald Dahl’s works to avoid offending modern sensibilities. Augustus Gloop, the gluttonous and heavyset child from Charlie and the Chocolate Factory, is no longer “fat” but instead “enormous.” What exactly is meant by a Gloop being “enormous” is unclear, though what is clear is that “enormous” and “fat” don’t mean the same thing. In The Twits, Mrs. Twit has been amended to only be described as “beastly” rather than “ugly and beastly.” An entire sentence has been added to The Witches, explaining that although the witches are bald beneath their witch wigs, “There are plenty of other reasons why women might wear wigs and there is certainly nothing wrong with that.”
Of course, the list of edits goes on. Oompa Loompa’s are no longer men, recast in new editions as simply “people.” Likewise with the Cloud-Men from James and the Giant Peach - they are now “Cloud-People.” The term “female” has also reportedly disappeared from a great many places, replaced with “woman” as a presumably friendlier term to those holding to the latest gender fashions. Sigh.
What exactly all of this is intended to accomplish, it is unclear. Certainly, there are those moderns who demand that all historical literature coincide with the verities of the day. Those works that don’t agree perfectly with the mores of the moment risk harsh rebuke, their ongoing presence in our society a sad reminder of just how horrible we all used to be some time in the past.
This latest effort by Puffin, to put it mildly, is beyond absurd. The very effort itself is offensive, or at least should be. What right do they have to openly flout the words of the deceased author himself while maintaining attribution to him? If they want a new line of gender inclusive and hyper-PC literature, write them now. Don’t go back and re-write the works of those who can no longer object. Certainly not when those edits are being made in the interest of tedious ideological agendas.
Abdullah al-Hallak writes in defense of Abu Hurayrah:
As I conclude, I am reminded of the words of Abu Bakr Al-Khatib Al-Baghdadi in his Kifayah. After mentioning the theology behind trusting the Companions of the Prophet , he left the readers with a deep thought. He concluded by mentioning that even if the verses and hadith related to the Companions did not exist, simply knowing the Companions, who they were, and what they had been through would be enough of a reason to trust them. I say that Abu Hurayah is no different. How he collected his hadith is not a mystery and the truth of it is attested to. His relatable and beneficial hadith speak true to the objectives of Islam and to his own honesty and transparency. The state of his students shows that he fostered a healthy environment of seeking truth. His relationship with ‘Omar was of trust and he was not singled out for scrutiny. ‘A’ishah’s disagreements with Abu Hurayrah were few and even then, some were purely artistic disagreements. These few disagreements did not lead ‘A’ishah to discredit Abu Hurayrah, with whom she shared students and occasionally corroborated in transmission and opinion, in addition to sometimes being on the same side of an argument.After all this, one can rightfully say, as ibn Khuzaymah said before, “Abu Hurayrah is only criticized, in order to reject his reports, by those whom Allah has blinded their hearts; they do not comprehend the meanings of the reports.”
Read the entire piece at MuslimMatters.
Allah Knows Best.